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Unpacking Adaptability 
Andreas Engert and D. Gordon Smith 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal Origins Theory holds that “legal origins—broadly 
interpreted as highly persistent systems of social control of economic 
life—have significant consequences for the legal and regulatory 
framework of the society, as well as for economic outcomes.”1 First 
proposed over a decade ago in a pair of papers by Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny 
(“LLSV”),2 Legal Origins Theory quickly grabbed the attention of 
legal scholars, but the caricatured portrayal of common law and civil 
law systems in those early papers3 prompted scathing criticisms.4 
Chastened but unbowed, LLSV and other economists continued to 
refine the theory.5 In a recent review of the substantial literature 
 
  Lecturer in Law, University of Munich. LL.M., University of Chicago, 2000. 
  Glen L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
 1. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 285, 326 (2008) [hereinafter La Porta, Economic Consequences]. 
 2. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta, Legal Determinants]; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta, Law and Finance]. 
 3. See Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 46 
(“Asked how much the group knew about common law and civil law when the project 
commenced, Shleifer said, ‘Nothing, literally.’”). 
 4. In this essay, we focus on corporate law, where the criticisms of Legal Origins 
Theory have been the strongest. See, e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law 
Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
697, 734 (2005) (“[T]he difference between common law and civil law with regard to 
shareholder protection is not as straightforward as the numbers in Law and Finance suggest—
at least not with regard to the corporate law of these traditions.”); Holger Spamann, On the 
Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Antidirector Rights Index’ Under 
Consistent Coding, at 1 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 67/2006, 2006) (“Proper re-coding 
reveals . . . that the results in La Porta et al. 1997, 1998 came about only through strong and 
systematic measurement error (inconsistent coding).”). 
 5. The original measure of shareholder protection—which LLSV called the anti-
director index—has been replaced by two other measures of shareholder protection. See 
Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 461 
(2008) [hereinafter Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing]; Rafael La Porta et al., 
What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006) [hereinafter La Porta, What Works in 
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generated by Legal Origins Theory, three of the LLSV authors 
concluded, “Since their publication about a decade ago, the two 
LLSV articles have taken some bumps. . . . [B]umps 
notwithstanding, the basic contribution appears to us to still be 
standing, perhaps even taller than a decade ago.”6  
Despite this sanguine assessment of Legal Origins Theory, LLSV 
have not persuasively described the mechanisms through which legal 
origins facilitate economic development. The question asked by Paul 
Mahoney still bedevils Legal Origins Theory: “Why should legal 
origin affect economic growth?”7 In this paper, we explore one 
proposed mechanism: adaptability. The adaptability hypothesis 
suggests that “legal traditions differ in their ability to evolve with 
changing conditions . . . and legal traditions that adapt efficiently to 
minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy 
and the legal system’s capabilities will foster financial development 
more effectively than more rigid systems.”8  
Economic development requires behavioral innovations, which 
stretch the fabric of law. Thus, adaptability is said to be an essential 
characteristic of a legal system that would facilitate economic 
development. As we discuss in some detail below, the chief 
methodological challenge confronting the empirical study of 
adaptability is that researchers cannot measure adaptability directly. 
Legal Origins Theory attempts to surmount this challenge, in the 
first instance, by using legal institutions as proxies for adaptability.9 
One of the foundational assumptions of Legal Origins Theory is that 
courts engage in highly contextualized rulemaking that improves the 
quality of law over time.10 Legal Origins Theory then takes this 
 
Securities Laws?]. 
 6. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 326. 
 7. Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506 (2001). Mahoney’s answer, though difficult to test empirically, 
has been embraced by LLSV. Inspired in part by the work of Friedrich Hayek (including 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960), and FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 
LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (1973)), Mahoney argued that “the common law is 
historically connected to strong protection for property rights against state action, whereas the 
civil law is connected to a strong and less constrained central government.” Mahoney, supra at 
507.   
 8. Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. 
COMP. ECON. 653, 655 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 9. See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 302–10.  
 10. Id. at 305. 
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assumption one step further, asserting that “judicial law making and 
adaptation play a greater role in common than in civil law.”11 Thus, 
legal origin becomes a second-order proxy for adaptability. We 
contend that adaptability is undertheorized and that a more nuanced 
understanding of adaptability reveals the implausibility of legal origin 
as proxy for adaptability.  
II. THE PURPORTED LINK BETWEEN ADAPTABILITY AND 
ECONOMIC SUCCESS 
Legal Origins Theory begins with the following proposition: 
“The two central dangers that any society faces are disorder and 
dictatorship.”12 Four institutions—private ordering, private 
litigation, regulation, and state ownership, ranked in order of 
increasing state power13—control these two dangers. A “fundamental 
tradeoff” inheres in the choice of institutions: “[A] state that has 
more powers to control disorder also has more for dictatorial 
 
 11. Id. at 306. 
 12. Simeon Djankov et al., The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 595, 
598 (2003). 
Disorder refers to the risk to individuals and their property of private expropriation 
in such forms as banditry, murder, theft, violation of agreements, torts, or monopoly 
pricing. Disorder is also reflected in the private subversion of public institutions, 
such as courts, through bribes and threats, which allows private violators to escape 
penalties. Dictatorship refers to the risk to individuals and their property of 
expropriation by the state and its agents in such forms as murder, taxation, or 
violation of property. Dictatorship is also reflected in expropriation through, rather 
than just by, the state, such as occurs when state regulators help firms to restrict 
competitive entry. Some phenomena, such as corruption, reflect both disorder and 
dictatorship. When individuals pay bribes to avoid penalties for harmful conduct, 
corruption is a reflection of disorder. When officials create harmful rules to collect 
bribes from individuals seeking to circumvent them, corruption is a cost of 
dictatorship. 
Id.  
 13. Id. at 601. 
These four basic strategies differ in the degree of public control. No public 
involvement is required with competition and private orderings. Courts employ 
impartial judges enforcing the rules of good behavior. These rules do not even need 
to come from legislation; rather, they may derive from custom or from judge-made 
common law. Even in this case, the judge is a public agent with decision-making 
authority. With regulators, the state writes the rules, inspects the product before it is 
sold, and penalizes sellers for delivering a bad product. Both the scope of 
government activity and its centralization are increased relative to independent 
courts. Finally, with state ownership, the government takes complete control over an 
activity. 
Id.  
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abuse.”14 The efficient institutional arrangement for a particular 
society is the one that minimizes the social costs of controlling 
disorder and dictatorship. 
Historically, legal systems either evolved to satisfy these 
competing demands15 or were imposed via transplantation.16 In 
either event, Legal Origins Theory holds that the resulting legal 
systems became important determinants of future economic 
development. As noted above, adaptability has come to play a crucial 
role in this story. According to Legal Origins Theory, adaptable legal 
systems produce superior substantive law that, in turn, leads to 
superior economic outcomes. While causation in Legal Origins 
Theory runs from adaptability to substantive law to economic 
outcomes,17 as we will see later, empirical support for the adaptability 
hypothesis seems to begin with an examination of substantive law 
and to flow backwards to an inference of adaptability.18  
In Law and Finance, the seminal paper in Legal Origins 
Theory,19 LLSV began with an idea about the possible role of law in 
economic development, and they set out to test that idea by 
 
 14. Id. at 598–99. 
 15. Id. at 605 (“In the 12th and 13th centuries, France was relatively decentralized and 
disorderly, with local notables successfully able to subvert all local institutions to their own 
advantage. In contrast, England was relatively peaceful and the king maintained control over 
the entire country. To counter disorder, it was efficient for France to adopt a legal system with 
more dictatorship than England’s, even at the cost of greater scope for sovereign abuse of the 
law.”). 
 16. Id. at 609 (“Although some institutional diversity can be explained by focusing on 
efficient choices, transplantation is a dramatic deviation from this approach. As European 
powers conquered much of the world in the 19th century, they brought with them their 
institutions, including their laws. A significant portion of the institutional variation among 
countries, especially with regard to legal systems, can be accounted for by transplantation.”). 
 17. Ironically, Legal Origins Theory is not much interested in the origins of law. One 
could imagine telling a story in which a set of legal rules constituted a starting point from 
which adaptation occurred. Under such a story, if path dependence played a prominent role, 
the content of those initial rules would become an important predictor of later developments. 
But Legal Origins Theory is not concerned with any substantive starting point. Instead, Legal 
Origins Theory focuses on the substantive results of legal evolution. Under this story, the 
importance of “legal origins” is procedural—the ability to adapt—not substantive. 
 18. While we suspect that LLSV would not phrase the point quite as we have done here, 
their recent survey article concedes that research on adaptability is largely theoretical, and that 
the limited number of attempts at empirical research on adaptability have produced mixed 
results. See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. 
 19. Law and Finance was published in 1998, and Legal Determinants of External 
Finance was published in 1997, but LLSV refer to the former as “our earlier article.” La Porta, 
Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1131. 
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examining the content of selected legal rules in forty-nine countries. 
More specifically, LLSV theorized that some countries provide 
greater legal protections to external investors than other countries, 
and LLSV conjectured that the strength of these legal protections 
would be correlated with levels of external investment. LLSV 
collected data on legal rules relating to shareholder and creditor 
protection, hoping to find that “differences in legal protections of 
investors might help explain why firms are financed and owned so 
differently in different countries.”20  
In that first paper, they purported to find substantial differences 
among countries with respect to the content of legal rules, and they 
also noticed a pattern in their data that would come to define their 
project. Differences in legal rules seemed to track two broadly 
defined legal traditions: common law and civil law. LLSV also 
observed differences among the three major families in the civil law 
tradition: French, German, and Scandinavian.21 The implication of 
these observations was that LLSV could “compare both the 
individual legal rules and whole legal families across a large number 
of countries.”22 More provocatively, their data on legal rules could 
be combined with data on economic outcomes (e.g., per capita gross 
national product) to permit judgments about the relative quality of 
legal systems.23 
The first paper did not make much progress on the correlation of 
legal protections with levels of external investment, but in the 
companion piece, Legal Determinants of External Finance, LLSV 
presented data on financial markets and concluded that “the legal 
environment has large effects on the size and breadth of capital 
markets across countries.”24 The findings in these first two papers 
were criticized on various grounds,25 but in a recent review essay, 
LLSV claim, “We have corrected our mistakes and have moved on to 
conceptually less ambiguous measures [that] have strengthened the 
original results.”26 
 
 20. La Porta, Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1114. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1115. 
 23. Id. at 1133, 1142–43. 
 24. La Porta, Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1132. 
 25. For a useful summary of criticisms, see Mathias Siems & Simon Deakin, 
Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future Research, J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. (2010). 
 26. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 291–92. The source of their pride 
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In the first stages of the development of Legal Origins Theory, 
LLSV did not discuss the adaptability hypothesis. Nevertheless, one 
perceives some recognition of the need to explain why the common 
law should provide better investor protections than the civil law. In 
Legal Determinants of External Finance, for example, LLSV offered 
this rather stark distinction between the two systems: “English law is 
common law, made by judges and subsequently incorporated into 
[legislation]. French, German, and Scandinavian laws, in contrast, 
are part of the scholar and legislator-made civil law tradition, which 
dates back to Roman law.”27 Over the ensuing years, LLSV have 
developed a more nuanced understanding of legal systems, but they 
continue to rely on the assumption that common law systems 
depend more heavily on judge-made law than civil law systems, even 
though legal scholars have pointed to the heavy reliance of common 
law systems on statutes and regulations for the protection of 
investors.28 Regardless of how this debate is resolved, the important 
point for present purposes is that LLSV associate common law 
systems with courts, and they associate courts with adaptability: “the 
greater respect for jurisprudence as a source of law in the common 
law countries, especially as compared to the French civil law 
countries, suggests that common law will be more adaptable to the 
changing circumstances.”29 
The manner in which Legal Origins Theory has developed shows 
that adaptability was an afterthought for LLSV. This is not to say 
that adaptability is unimportant,30 but rather that it has not been 
 
was a pair of articles measuring shareholder protection through self-dealing regulation and 
securities laws, respectively. Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, supra note 5; La 
Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5. 
 27. La Porta, Legal Determinants, supra note 2, at 1131 (citation omitted). Note the 
awkwardly phrased assumption that the common law is “subsequently incorporated into 
legislature.” As discussed below, this assumption becomes a cornerstone of LLSV’s response to 
legal scholars who claim that much of investor-protection law is codified. 
 28. See Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 460 (2006); Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Diversity of Shareholder Protection in 
Common Law Countries, 5 J. INSTITUTIONAL COMPARISONS 3 (2007); Howell Jackson & 
Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harv. 
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-28, 2009). 
 29. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. 
 30. Indeed, absent an explanation for the superiority of the common law, one might 
surmise that the correlation of legal systems with economic outcomes was simply correlation 
without causation. For alternative hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the 
correlation, see id. at 310–16. 
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subjected to the same detailed attention as other aspects of the 
project. Our reading of LLSV goes like this: countries with superior 
economic outcomes tend to have superior substantive law (i.e., 
common law), which, by its very existence, implies superior 
adaptability. In this research, economic outcomes and substantive 
law are observed empirically, but adaptability is merely implied. 
Thus, adaptability is not so much an explanatory variable or causal 
mechanism as a designation that adheres to successful legal systems. 
In the language of logicians, it is not a premise, but a conclusion. If a 
country is economically successful, the legal system must be 
adaptable. 
The foregoing would be viewed as an exaggeration by LLSV, 
who do not rely solely on logic for the proposition that common law 
systems are more adaptable than civil law systems.31 Yet as matters 
stand, LLSV’s notion of adaptability is severely undertheorized. In 
what follows, we look more deeply into both the theoretical 
foundations and the empirical support for the adaptability 
hypothesis. 
III. UNPACKING THE THEORY 
Intuitively, the idea that adaptability of the law conduces to 
better rules and from there to economic success is appealing. 
Nevertheless, it is far from clear what “adaptability” in this account 
actually means. Without a more precise understanding of the 
concept, there is no way of comparing the degree of adaptability 
among different jurisdictions. In the context of Legal Origins 
Theory, we need to distinguish adaptability from other stories about 
why common law jurisdictions supposedly differ from other legal 
families, such as political explanations. Also, if adaptability is to 
provide a causal link from legal origin to substantive merit, 
adaptability must itself be distinct and separable from economic 
outcomes. In this section, we clarify some of these conceptual issues 
and define adaptability. As it turns out, adaptability is a rather 
complex quality, which does not bode well for any test of a 
hypothesis that presupposes the ability to compare adaptability across 
jurisdictions.  
 
 31. As a matter of theory, they rely on FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF 
LIBERTY (1960). See La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. For the role of the 
courts as a proxy for greater adaptability of the common law, see infra Part IV.B. 
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A. Defining Adaptability 
As a first shot, an adaptable legal system should be one that 
responds efficiently to changes in regulated behavior when existing 
legal rules are not up to the task. We therefore begin by 
contemplating changes in regulated behavior, which we call 
behavioral innovations. A behavioral innovation is any deviation from 
a familiar pattern of behavior. The term “innovation” is not meant to 
suggest that the new behavior is desirable from a social perspective. 
A behavioral innovation can create value, but it may just as well 
produce large costs for society. For example, value-enhancing 
innovations in business and finance might include milestone 
financing in venture capital contracts, stock option compensation for 
management, and the index fund. By contrast, some innovations 
serve the interests of the innovators but impose social costs 
exceeding the benefits. “Bad” innovations may be new ways of 
exploiting an agency relationship, such as shifting assets from the 
balance sheet to misrepresent earnings, inventing novel methods for 
asset tunneling, or filing frivolous lawsuits to extort unjustified 
ransom payments. The category of value-destroying innovations 
emphasizes the law’s role in curbing agency costs. Adaptability 
implies that the law responds quickly and effectively to new agency 
problems and does not allow them to hamper economic activity for 
an extended period of time. In this regard, adaptability takes up 
investor protection as a main theme of Legal Origins Theory. 
Most innovations cannot be easily categorized as either value-
enhancing (“good”) or value-destroying (“bad”), but an optimal 
legal system would be adept at sorting innovations so as to permit 
and even encourage value creation while suppressing harmful 
innovations. Thus, adaptability must be more than random responses 
to behavioral innovations. On the other hand, one cannot simply 
infer adaptability from superior economic outcomes or from superior 
legal rules. In doing so, the concept of adaptability would cease to be 
an explanation, other than a tautological one. To account for the 
substantive quality of legal rules, therefore, adaptability must be 
something distinct and separable from economic or legal outcomes. 
 What makes adaptability more than a truism is the responsiveness 
of the legal system. A legal system may choose not to react to a 
behavioral innovation because rule-makers adhere to excessively 
“formalist” views, because they consider the costs associated with a 
change to outweigh the benefits of the change, or because they are 
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lazy. Whatever the reasons, responsiveness refers to the possibility 
that a behavioral innovation would not cause a change in law, even 
though a new legal rule might be superior in some respects to the 
existing legal rule. The adaptability of a given legal system, therefore, 
depends on both (i) the responsiveness to behavioral innovations 
(i.e., readiness to change the law in reaction to a change in regulated 
behavior) and (ii) the proficiency in devising efficient legal rules (i.e., 
the probability that the response is in fact value-enhancing).  
Under this account of adaptability, legal rules may be less than 
optimal either because the legal system failed to respond to a 
behavioral innovation or because the responses, past or present, 
produce rules that are substantively deficient. The fact that legal 
systems differ in their responsiveness to change is not a new 
observation. For instance, many commentators claim that civil law 
courts are more “formalist” than common law courts in applying 
legal authority and, therefore, less responsive to behavioral 
innovations. But even when the courts (or legislatures or regulatory 
agencies) are ready to respond to behavioral innovations, the new 
legal rules that they create will not necessarily be value-enhancing. 
Responsiveness, standing alone, is insufficient to produce the desired 
results. Law-making institutions also have to produce good legal 
rules with some consistency.  
B. The Optimal Amount of Adaptability 
The capability of legal institutions to devise value-enhancing 
rules is undeniably important, but the responsiveness of legal 
institutions to behavioral innovations can be a two-edged sword. 
When a law-making institution changes a legal rule, the institution 
engages in a new policy analysis instead of subjecting the behavior to 
existing legal rules. Thus, responsiveness implies rejection of legal 
authority.  
It follows that the more responsive a legal system, the less people 
can rely on legal authority to predict how the law is going to deal 
with their behavior. As individual cases are never exactly alike, a law-
making institution can almost always find some amount of behavioral 
innovation to distinguish present circumstances from the past. At 
extreme levels of responsiveness, the existing body of legal authority 
would cease to provide meaningful guidance for behavior. We 
perceive, therefore, a tradeoff between the benefits of responsiveness 
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and the law’s role in guiding behavior.32 Thus, a legal system may 
not only suffer from too little responsiveness (and adaptability), but 
also from excessive responsiveness (and a lack of predictability).33 
The optimum amount of responsiveness depends on how important 
predictability is for a given type of behavior. It also varies with the 
degree of proficiency of the law-making institution because 
responsiveness is more valuable if it is more likely to result in an 
efficient rule.  
The tradeoff between responsiveness (adaptability) and 
predictability is still consistent with Legal Origins Theory’s story that 
the common law is more efficient because it is more adaptable. It 
may be that civil law jurisdictions are below the optimal level of 
adaptability, and that being more adaptable would be more efficient. 
However, the opposite can just as well be true: the more adaptable 
jurisdiction may have moved beyond the optimum where greater 
adaptability, on balance, hurts business activity more than it fosters 
desirable innovation. If we assume that common law jurisdictions are 
more adaptable, this could be a driver of economic success, but also 
an impediment to it. In any event, increasing the adaptability of the 
law—and hence making the law less predictable—is not a general 
policy advice to enhance overall efficiency. 
IV. UNPACKING THE EVIDENCE (WHAT LITTLE THERE IS) 
In theory, adaptability can explain why a particular jurisdiction 
has superior legal rules, though the argument is more complicated 
than the original conjecture. The even greater challenge lies in 
putting the theory to a test.  
A. The Daunting Difficulty of Observing Adaptability 
To detect a link between adaptability and legal rules one must be 
able to measure the degree of adaptability in a given jurisdiction. 
 
 32. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Adaptability in Elbonia, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 393, 
404–05 (2006) (arguing that adaptability tends to collide with legal certainty). 
 33. The debate on charter competition provides an example in point: Delaware has been 
accused of keeping its law excessively indeterminate. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory 
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908 (1998) 
(arguing that indeterminacy increases Delaware’s market power); Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 
1232 (2001) (explaining indeterminacy as a means of price discrimination in the market for 
corporate charters).  
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This is not a trivial exercise. As noted above, Legal Origins Theory 
seems to suggest that the best evidence of adaptability is the sort of 
robust economic development associated with countries that have 
the preferred legal system (i.e., common law). Of course, this is not a 
viable strategy for testing the adaptability hypothesis because it 
assumes the very link that it seeks to detect. In fact, we cannot think 
of any promising way to capture the proficiency aspect of 
adaptability, other than looking at the results of the rulemaking 
process.34 Measuring adaptability, therefore, focuses on measuring 
the law’s responsiveness to behavioral innovations.35  
Unfortunately, responsiveness is an evasive feature as well. A 
plausible approach would be to look at the amount of rule change in 
a jurisdiction. But what exactly constitutes a rule change? One might 
imagine a quantitative measure of new rules created by the legislature 
or regulatory agencies.36 Because statutes and regulations are 
formally enacted and promulgated, there is a clear-cut event that 
marks the change in applicable rules. But even if one arrived at a 
method for counting such rule changes, it would only reflect the 
responsiveness of legislatures and regulators. As we will see, LLSV’s 
claim that common law jurisdictions are more adaptable than their 
civil law counterparts rests critically on the role of the courts. 
Leaving out rule changes brought about by the courts would miss an 
 
 34. One potential avenue would be to measure the resources devoted to rulemaking. 
However, at least with regard to the courts, it is difficult to separate rulemaking from simple 
adjudication. The sheer volume of litigation does not appear to be a good proxy for the courts’ 
ability to create efficient rules.  
 35. In a recent study of legal evolution, John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele, and 
Mathias Siems describe two types of study that can contribute to our understanding of the 
links between law and financial development. The study of “outcomes” would ask whether 
changes in particular legal rules lead to changes in financial markets (or vice versa), while the 
study of “mechanisms” would examine changes in the various protections afforded to 
shareholders, creditors, or workers. John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence 
from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 579, 579–80 (2009). Outcome studies could attempt to test the adaptability 
hypothesis by measuring either proficiency (when the studies ask whether changes in particular 
legal rules lead to changes in financial markets) or responsiveness (when the studies ask 
whether changes in financial markets lead to changes in particular legal rules). Armour et al. 
use the study of mechanisms to propose an alternative to the adaptability and political 
channels, which they call the “institutional channel.” Id. at 596. 
 36. For a study in this vein, see Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 
J. COMP. ECON. 676, 689–91 (2003) (counting major changes to corporate law statutes in ten 
jurisdictions). 
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important mechanism of adaptability—the most important one 
according to Legal Origins Theory.  
At the same time, measuring the amount of new rules created by 
the courts is next to impossible. The key difficulty lies in 
distinguishing between applying an existing rule and creating a new 
one. When confronted with a behavioral innovation, a court can still 
invoke an existing rule—and will tend to do so—to decide the case. 
The observer is then left to determine if applying the rule to the fact 
pattern amounts to “changing” the rule, which would require a 
definition of the original rule’s scope as a reference point. It is hard 
to see how such an analysis might be conducted with a minimum 
degree of reliability.  
Summing up, there is little hope of observing the amount of rule 
changes as a proxy for the law’s responsiveness and hence 
adaptability. In view of the methodological difficulties, it is hardly 
surprising that evidence for or against the adaptability hypothesis has 
remained scarce.37 The only argument that LLSV have put forward 
on behalf of the adaptability hypothesis is a rather indirect piece of 
evidence—the role of the courts as a proxy for adaptability.  
B. The Uncertain Role of the Courts 
Legal Origins Theory claims that adaptability is an important 
comparative advantage of common law systems over civil law 
systems. The source of the common law’s comparative advantage is 
courts, and what LLSV admire about courts is that “the ability of 
judges to react to changing circumstances—the adaptability of 
common law—tends to improve the law’s quality over time.”38 The 
only attempt at studying the court-adaptability nexus empirically has 
been undertaken by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross 
Levine, who contrasted two theories of why legal origin influences 
economic development—the “adaptability channel” and the 
“political channel”—and concluded that “legal origin matters 
because legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust efficiently to 
evolving socioeconomic conditions.”39 Unfortunately for LLSV, the 
 
 37. See Siems, supra note 32, at 399–403 (providing an extensive collection of proxies 
for adaptability).  
 38. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. 
 39. See Beck et al., supra note 8, at 672. 
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limitations of this study are substantial. The authors identify only 
two “indicators” of adaptability for each country:  
(1) “Case law” is a dummy variable borrowed from an LLSV 
paper,40 which gives the case law variable a value of 1 if “judicial 
decisions in a given country are a source of law.”41 Otherwise, the 
variable is assigned a value of 0.42 To determine whether a country 
is in one category or the other, LLSV relied on the International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, published in 1973.43 
(2) The other indicator is “legal justification,” which “indicates 
whether judgments are based on statutory law rather than on 
principles of equity.”44 This variable is also borrowed from an 
LLSV paper,45 and it is assigned a value of 0, 0.33, 0.67, or 1, 
“where higher values signify the legal system imposes greater 
requirements that judgments be based on statutory law.”46 
While we applaud the effort of the authors to bring some rigor 
to the analysis of adaptability, we find these variables much too 
simplistic. Even if the variables were coded with care, whether 
judicial opinions are a “source of law” is the sort of inquiry that does 
not lend itself to binary resolution. Moreover, we agree with Mathias 
Siems that the legal justification variable is “too limited[,] as the 
degree of legal adaptability of a particular country depends on a 
larger set of criteria.”47  
The dearth of explicit empirical support is but one shortcoming 
of LLSV’s claim that the greater reliance on courts makes the 
common law more adaptable. Ironically, the supposedly superior 
substantive law identified in Legal Origins Theory does not consist 
primarily of judge-made rules. In Law and Finance, LLSV identified 
eight rules relating to shareholder protection: one share-one vote, 
proxy by mail, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting 
or proportional representation, oppressed minorities mechanism, 
 
 40. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 451 
tbl.1 (2004) [hereinafter, La Porta, Judicial Checks and Balances]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See id. at 469. 
 44. Beck et al., supra note 8, at 664. 
 45. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453, 465 tbl.1 (2003) [hereinafter 
Djankov, Courts]. 
 46. Beck et al., supra note 8, at 664. 
 47. Siems, supra note 32, at 398. 
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preemptive rights, percentage of share capital to call an extraordinary 
shareholders meeting, and mandatory dividends.48 With one possible 
exception (minority oppression),49 all of these topics are governed in 
the United States by statutory provisions, not by judge-made law. 
Therefore, if courts were the engines of adaptability, they would 
have only minimal influence over investor protection as initially 
conceived by LLSV. 
After this initial effort was criticized for being too simplistic,50 
LLSV developed two new measures of shareholder protection. First, 
in What Works in Securities Laws?,51 LLSV examined the role of 
securities laws in the issuance of new equity in public capital markets. 
They concluded that “securities laws matter,” and the securities laws 
that matter most are disclosure rules and anti-fraud rules.52 These 
results are consistent with the expansive and evolving notion of 
“legal origins” that now informs Legal Origins Theory, namely, that 
“common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to 
support private market outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace 
such outcomes with state-desired allocations.”53 Nevertheless, it is 
hard to discern a way in which they support the adaptability 
hypothesis. While private litigation may be an important avenue for 
fraud prosecution in common law countries, the legal rules 
governing fraud are generated almost exclusively by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission or trading organizations, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange. Simply stated, this rulemaking structure 
 
 48. La Porta, Law and Finance, supra note 2, at 1122–23. 
 49. Minority oppression is often regulated through private litigation over common law 
fiduciary duties, but the exception is only “possible” because many states codify rules relating 
to minority oppression. For a description of the evolution of the cause of action of shareholder 
oppression, including both legislative and judicial developments, see Robert B. Thompson, The 
Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). 
 50. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 4 n.6 (2001) (“By no means is it here 
implied that these rights are unimportant, but they seem to supply only partial and sometimes 
easily outflanked safeguards, which have little to do with the protection of control and the 
entitlement to a control premium.”). 
 51. La Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5. 
 52. Id. at 27–28. 
 53. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 286. With respect to securities 
laws, LLSV reasons, “The benefits of common law appear to lie in its emphasis on private 
contracting and standardized disclosure and in its reliance on private dispute resolution using 
market-friendly standards of liability.” La Porta, What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 5, 
at 28. 
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does not contemplate a special role for courts in improving the 
quality of law as “judges . . . react to changing circumstances.”54 
A similar shortcoming with respect to the adaptability hypothesis 
afflicts the second new measure of shareholder protection, found in 
The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing.55 In this article, LLSV 
construct an “index of the strength of minority shareholder 
protection against self-dealing by the controlling shareholder (anti-
self-dealing index)”56 based on variables developed from a survey of 
Lex Mundi law firms.57 The authors point to the UK as the 
prototype of self-dealing regulation among common law countries, 
but the strength of the UK system does not reside in the courts. 
Indeed, LLSV observed that when courts were ineffective, 
“legislators stepped in to put constraints on self-dealing.”58 
Common law and civil law systems may exhibit a “pronounced 
difference” in shareholder protection,59 but that difference for the 
most part does not reside in the use of courts.60 
While many scholars other than LLSV have argued that legal 
origin is a viable proxy for “adaptability”—loosely defined—Legal 
Origins Theory seems to have no need for adaptability that emanates 
from courts. LLSV recognize this fundamental incoherence in the 
adaptability hypothesis, and they attempt to elide the problem by 
claiming that statutes are simply codifications of past judicial 
opinions.61 While this is certainly true in some cases, including 
 
 54. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. 
 55. Djankov, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, supra note 5. 
 56. Id. at 432. 
 57. As noted by LLSV, “Lex Mundi is an association of international law firms with 
members in 108 countries.” Id. at 431. 
 58. Id. at 439. 
 59. Id. at 462. 
 60. But the authors observe, “The U.S. seems to be the exception, with its greater 
emphasis on ex post litigation rather than ex ante disclosure and approval.” Id. at 463. Given 
that self-dealing regulation in the United States is accomplished, to a great extent, by fiduciary 
duty litigation, we could imagine an adaptability story on this topic that cast courts in the 
leading role. While one would still have the burden of showing a connection between fiduciary 
law and economic outcomes, this does not seem like an implausible tale. Ironically, in the 
moment when we see an opening for the adaptability hypothesis, LLSV foreclose the 
possibility by concluding that courts are not an important part of self-dealing regulation in 
most of the world. 
 61. See, e.g., La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 290 (“Statutes in 
common law countries often follow and reflect judicial rulings, so jurisprudence remains the 
basis of statutory law. Even when legislation in common law countries runs ahead of judicial 
law making, it often must coexist with, and therefore reflects, preexisting common law rules.”). 
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minority oppression statutes,62 it is not true with regard to many 
rules examined in the foregoing articles. LLSV also claim that 
statutes in common law countries are less precise than their 
counterparts in civil law jurisdictions,63 though this sounds like the 
generalization of a person who has never hefted a volume containing 
federal securities laws. Finally, in the ultimate bootstrapping 
argument, LLSV assert, “because legal origins shape fundamental 
approaches to social control of business, even legislation in common 
law countries expresses the common law way of doing things.”64 
Even if we accepted the notion that all of the rules relating to 
shareholder protection identified by LLSV were dependent in some 
fundamental way on judicial action, the adaptability hypothesis 
would be woefully incomplete because it exaggerates the backward-
looking nature of adaptability. Implicit in early attempts to think 
about the importance of adaptability to economic development is the 
idea that law is reflexive. While judges certainly consider the 
prospective effects of their rulings, the principal orientation of courts 
is backward looking. Legislatures and regulatory agencies, on the 
other hand, tend to make laws in anticipation of future events, albeit 
with an eye on the lessons learned in the past. While legislators and 
bureaucrats may be responding to past factual developments, the 
principal orientation of legislatures and regulatory agencies in rule-
making mode is forward looking. 
Law typically adapts both through backward-looking and 
forward-looking actions. For example, changes in the shareholder 
census in the United States over the past several decades and the 
resulting increase in shareholder activism have prompted  
various innovations in private ordering,65 litigation,66  
 
 62. Thompson, supra note 3. 
 63. See, e.g., La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 291 (“[S]tatutes in 
common law countries are often highly imprecise, with an expectation that courts will spell out 
the rules as they begin to be applied.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. The rise of corporate governance ratings agencies is one important manifestation of 
private ordering as a result of increased shareholder activism. On the dubious quality of such 
ratings, see Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance 
Ratings? (John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Stanford Law Sch., Working Paper No. 
360, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093. 
 66. Shareholders have been actively pursuing more expansive participation in corporate 
governance through innovative lawsuits. See, e.g., Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737 (Del. 
Ch. 2006) (relating to a shareholder-proposed bylaw limiting the duration of a board-
authorized rights plan to one year); Am. Fed’n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Am. 
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regulation,67 and legislation.68 These changes are part of an iterative 
process, with law responding to changes in facts and facts responding 
to changes in law. 
The foregoing analysis reaffirms that adaptability is an attribute 
of all legal institutions. This insight implies the need to channel legal 
reforms to the institution that is best equipped to provide such 
reforms.69 LLSV favor legal systems that channel a higher percentage 
of reforms through courts because “the ability of judges to react to 
changing circumstances—the adaptability of common law—tends to 
improve the law’s quality over time.”70 On the other hand, 
legislatures and regulatory agencies may have a better capacity to 
make wide-ranging policy decisions.71 We see no reason a priori to 
favor one form of adaptation over the other, and we believe that 
Legal Origins Theory favors courts primarily because this view 
provides an ex post justification for the observation that economic 
outcomes tend to be more favorable in common law countries than 
civil law countries.72 
 
Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (relating to a shareholder-proposed bylaw 
permitting shareholder-nominated candidates to be included on the corporate ballot). 
 67. The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed “changes to the federal 
proxy rules to remove impediments to the exercise of shareholders’ rights to nominate and 
elect directors to company boards of directors.” Securities Release No. 33-9046, June 10, 
2009, “Facilitating Shareholders Director Nominations,” available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-9046.pdf. 
 68. Delaware recently amended the General Corporation Law to allow a corporation to 
adopt a bylaw that would require the corporation to include shareholder nominees for director 
positions on the corporation's proxy statement, subject to limitations set forth in the bylaws. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009). 
 69. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 INT’L L. & POL. 931 
(2003); Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law 
Jurisdictions: Lessons from the Incomplete Law Theory (European Corporate Governance 
Institute, Working Paper No. 01/2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=343480. 
 70. La Porta, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 305. 
 71. The relative competencies of legislatures, agencies, and courts have occupied many 
volumes of legal scholarship. We need not attempt to synthesize that learning here, where the 
point is simply that legislatures and agencies may be in a better position to adapt than courts. 
See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 608, 
616–17 (1992) (“Legislatures may be better equipped to draw upon technical expertise than 
courts,” and while “[l]egislatures were intentionally devised to make changing laws difficult 
(absent rather broad agreement on the need for change) . . ., a legislature can delegate 
rulemaking authority to an agency, so that rules may be changed more readily.”). 
 72. In an important study of procedural formalism in courts, LLSV observe that many 
institutions—including reputations, informal discussions, regulatory agencies, and courts—
secure property and enforce contracts, but “[e]conomic theory does not tell us which of  
these . . . is the best.” Djankov, Courts, supra note 45, at 454. Although many economists 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The impossibility of measuring adaptability directly has 
prompted Legal Origins Theory to rely on the role of the courts as a 
proxy for adaptability. We have argued that this argument fails to 
connect with the differences in substantive law that—according to 
LLSV—are responsible for the competitive advantage of common 
law jurisdictions. For the time being, adaptability in Legal Origins 
Theory is a theoretical construct, not an empirical concept. An 
alternative empirical approach might start from the premise that the 
more adaptable a jurisdiction becomes the less predictable it is. 
Indeterminacy of the law could thus serve as a proxy for adaptability 
(responsiveness). A recent study comparing the degree of 
indeterminacy of corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany concludes that German law seems to rely 
more on indeterminate standards than the two common law 
jurisdictions.73 This first piece of evidence runs against the notion 
that common law courts are more ready to adapt the law to changing 
circumstances. As it stands, the adaptability hypothesis is still a far cry 
from conclusively explaining the superiority, real or alleged, of the 
common law.  
 
 
 
have assumed that courts are the best institution for securing property and enforcing contracts, 
LLSV found that “even . . . simple disputes are resolved extremely slowly by courts in most 
countries,” though the results show “huge variation among countries in the speed and quality 
of courts.” Id. The key factor driving delays is “procedural formalism,” and LLSV argue that 
less procedure generally leads to more efficiency. Id. at 511. 
In another line of research on courts, Edward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer argue that 
judicial independence is one of the defining characteristics of the common law. Edward L. 
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002). In a later empirical 
study of judicial independence, LLSV find that “judicial independence is empirically strongly 
associated with common-law legal origin and is itself a strong predictor of some of the same 
economic freedoms as common law.” La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, supra note 
40, at 449. Thus, “judicial independence accounts for some . . . of the beneficial effects of 
common law on economic freedom.” Id. 
Both of these lines of research suggest that common law courts are better than civil law 
courts in ways that matter to economic development, but neither line of research tells us that 
courts are better able to promote adaptability than other legal institutions. 
 73. Jens Dammann, Regulatory Competition and Legal Determinacy in Corporate Law 
(Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. Law and Econ. Res. Paper No. 166, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491864. 
